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Abstract— Trust in software services is a key prerequisite 
for the success and wide adoption of Services-Oriented 
Computing (SOC) in an open Internet world. However, 
trust is poorly assessed by existing methods and 
technologies, especially in dynamically composed and 
deployed SOC systems. In this paper, we discuss current 
methods for assessing trust in Service-Oriented Computing 
and identify gaps of current platforms, in particular with 
regards to runtime trust assessment. To address these gaps, 
we propose a model of runtime trust assessment of software 
services and introduce a framework for realizing the model. 
A key characteristic of our approach is the support that it 
offers for customizable assessment of trust based on 
evidence collected during the operation of software services 
and its ability to combine this evidence with subjective 
assessments coming from service clients. 
Keywords: trust, runtime assessment, web services 
I. INTRODUCTION 
To become pervasive and open up to a wide range of 
applications and the general public, Service-Oriented 
Computing (SOC) needs to foster dynamic and 
trustworthy service interactions. The current state of the 
art in SOC systems provides complex and flexible means 
for static and dynamic service discovery and composition, 
and tailoring services to the consumer. However, current 
SOC technology provides less adequate support for 
assessing the trustworthiness of services, especially in 
situations where the latter need be dynamically linked and 
deployed by SOC systems.  
As SOC aims to create business and commercial 
communities through the use of distributed services, 
service trust comes naturally into the equation as a 
prerequisite of the wider acceptance of the SOC paradigm 
and its development to its full potential. This is because 
service clients need to be able to trust the services that 
they want to use remotely and ascertain dynamically that 
the services they already use remain trustworthy. Also, 
without building trust assessment within SOC systems, 
services of newcomers won’t have an opportunity to get 
deployed in the presence of service providers with well-
established brands. Furthermore, it should be appreciated 
that services cannot be delivered cost-effectively without 
trust. This because the lack of explicit social or context 
relationships in the establishment of service agreements 
and the absence of trust may necessitate complex and 
costly legal agreements, which would not be easy to 
achieve in dynamic service deployment contexts. 
Despite the recognition of the importance and 
necessity of trust in human interactions and exchanges 
and, as a consequence, the recent increase of the volume 
of the literature on this topic (e.g. [5], [9], [11], [14], 
[17]), the role of trust in SOC has not been fully realised 
yet and trust is currently assessed poorly for the purposes 
of the new paradigm. This is because, most of the existing 
work addresses service trust through methods and 
techniques for securing service interactions, including 
standards for representing security credentials such as 
WS-Trust [2]. There have also been platforms for 
reasoning about trust and security properties in particular 
service deployment architectures (e.g. grid [1], [23]). 
However, existing work fails to address some important 
aspects of service trust, notably the need to assess trust in 
dynamically composed and deployed services, ground it 
not only on subjective opinions but also on dynamically 
acquired information about the behaviour and quality of 
services in diverse deployment contexts, and the ability to 
evaluate the accuracy and risk of trust assessments [20]. 
To address these shortcomings, in this paper we 
propose a model of dynamic trust assessment of web 
services and an architecture for realising this model. The 
proposed trust assessment model combines objective 
information acquired during the deployment of services in 
different contexts at runtime with subjective 
recommendations from service clients and uses this 
information to provide trust assessments for different 
service provision promises expressed within service level 
agreements (SLAs). The realisation of this approach is 
based on a platform that incorporates runtime service 
monitoring as a key element and offers trust assessment 
services to service clients and providers. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In 
Section 2, we present a scenario that forms the basis for 
explaining our approach. In Section 3, we present the 
basic conceptual model of trust assessment and the 
architecture of the platform that realises the model. In 
Section 4, we discuss the generation of trust assessment in 
more detail. In Section 5, we give an account of related 
work and, finally, in Section 6 we provide some 
concluding remarks and present directions for future 
work. 
II. A SCENARIO OF TRUST ASSESSM
BASED SYSTEMS 
To indicate the requirements fo
assessment and demonstrate the basic
approach in the rest of the paper, we wil
a service based e-healthcare system that
the EU-IST Framework 6 project SE
system that underpins our scenario is sh
In this system, patients are equipped
Monitoring Equipment (HME) which
medical conditions and notifies a H
Service (HTS) of health signals that sh
by a doctor. When HTS receives a 
HME, it searches through a registry 
doctors that it maintains, and if it finds a
deal with the reported symptoms, it con
a request to handle the case. To recei
HTS, doctors are equipped with PDAs 
web service that enables the processing o
A doctor can decline or accept a requ
the latter case, (s)he subsequently exam
makes a medical recommendation for th
This recommendation may be of differe
the provision of a medical prescription, a
for admission to hospital, or a recomm
further action. The doctors collaboratin
offer their services under differen
Agreements (SLAs). A doctor may, f
agreed to offer recommendation serv
specific working hours or only for patie
suffer from particular medical conditions
Figure 1.  A Dynamic Web Services e-Hea
In cases where a doctor responds
prescription, HTS contacts a pharma
dispatch the set of prescribed medicines
achieve this, HTS calls pharmacies w
medical prescription orders through 
service and physically deliver the prescr
the patients. HTS maintains a list of p
covering different locations. Pharma
available under different SLAs. Som
example, may promise to deliver order
certain postcodes within a maximum tim
orders only if the cost of the service is
HTS. Other pharmacies, however, may 
whose cost is to be covered by the me
the patient. 
                                              
1
 SERENITY focuses on runtime support for secu
– see http://www.serenity-project.org 
ENT IN SERVICE 
r dynamic trust 
 elements of our 
l use a scenario of 
 has been used in 
RENITY 1 . The 
own in Figure 1. 
 with a Health 
 monitors their 
ealth Treatment 
ould be examined 
notification from 
of collaborating 
 doctor who could 
tacts him/her with 
ve requests from 
running a specific 
f HTS requests. 
est from HTS. In 
ines the data and 
e patient to HTS. 
nt types including 
 recommendation 
endation for no 
g with HTS may 
t Service Level 
or instance, have 
ices only within 
nts which do not 
.  
lthcare Scenario 
 with a medical 
cy to order and 
 to the patient. To 
hich can accept 
a pharmacy web 
ibed medicines to 
harmacy services 
cy services are 
e of them, for 
ed medications to 
e limit or accept 
 to be covered by 
also accept orders 
dical insurance of 
            
rity and dependability 
Trust is fundamental to the
pharmacy services in our scena
different factors and assessed
case of doctor services, for exa
by the real availability of docto
that their contract/SLA determ
which are important for the 
specific doctor services, up-to
services with respect to the
necessary for the continuation
services. 
In the case of pharmacy ser
service availability and/or th
service to deliver correctly or
the promised time. Furthermo
since initially the HTS will not
interactions with a particular p
its delivery efficiency, it woul
an assessment of this factor b
particular service with other sy
Current SOC technologies 
of the above scenario, but are
assessment issues related to it
trust assessment models either
of service performance against
when they take such evidence
is typically limited to intera
needing the trust assessment
rather than taking into account
service interactions different
deployment. 
III. OUR A
A. Trust assessment model 
Our approach to the trust a
is based on the conceptual mod
Figure 2.  Conceptual mod
According to this model, tru
by some TrustAuthority. This
from the provider of a particu
The role of the trust authority
service registry in cases where
in assessing the trustworthines
or some other party. 
The basic outcome of the tr
trustcard. A trustcard is gener
EvideEvidenceDigest
derivedFrom
Recom
TrustCard generates  * 
1  co
Context validIn 1 
*  relatesTo
SLATerm  gu
Operational
Evidence 
Digest
Reputation
Uncertainty
1  hasUncertainty
TrustCriisBasedOn *
1  contains
refersTo 1
Underpins  * 
 deployment of doctor and 
rio and may be affected by 
 in different ways. In the 
mple, trust may be affected 
rs within the service hours 
ines. For any such factors 
trust that HTS casts upon 
-date assessments of these 
 relevant factors will be 
 of the deployment of the 
vices, trust may depend on 
e ability of a pharmacy 
dered prescriptions within 
re, it should be noted that 
 have a sufficient history of 
harmacy service to assess 
d beneficial for it to obtain 
ased on interactions of the 
stems. 
enable the implementation 
 unable to tackle the trust 
. More specifically, current 
 neglect runtime evidence 
 designated trust criteria or, 
 into account, the evidence 
ctions between the client 
 and the specific service 
 a broader picture of actual 
 clients and contexts of 
PPROACH 
ssessment of web services 
el shown in Figure 2.  
 
el of a trust assessment 
st assessment is performed 
 authority is independent 
lar service and its clients. 
 may be undertaken by a 
 the registry has an interest 
s of the services that it lists 
ust assessment activity is a 
ated by the trust authority 
Service
nceElement 
Operational
Evidence 
Element 
mendation 
ncerns 
arantees  * 
ServiceClient
UsedBy  * 
1  collectedFrom 
*  derivedFrom 
derivedFrom  *
TrustAuthority
teria 
collectedFrom  1 
isGeneratedBy 1 
(as shown by the association 
TrustCard−isGeneratedBy→TrustAuthority2  in Figure 2) 
to represent an assessment of trust that the authority has in 
a particular term of the SLA under which a service is 
offered at a given instance of time and in a particular 
context. Hence, a trustcard always refers to an SLA term 
(see the association Trustcard−relatesTo→SLATerm in 
Figure 2), expressing some Quality-of-Service (QoS) 
factor (e.g. availability of service as a whole, performance 
of particular service operations) or behavioural service 
property. The association of trustcards with particular 
SLA terms reflects the need for providing fine grain trust 
assessments with respect to specific properties. Thus, in 
our approach, trust cannot refer to service providers in 
general without reference to a particular service that they 
provide. This is because providers may be trusted for 
some of the services they provide but not other. A bank, 
for example, may be trusted for its basic retail banking 
services but not its investment services. 
To substantiate the trust assessment that it represents, 
a trustcard includes evidence digest (ED) elements (see 
the association TrustCard−Contains→EvidenceDigest in 
Figure 2). An evidence digest element is derived from 
processing several different trust related evidence 
elements for a service, as expressed by the association 
EvidenceDigest −derivedFrom→EvidenceElement in 
Figure 2. An evidence element (EE) is a signed and 
verified package of data which has been collected either 
during the operation of the service or from a particular 
service client and is relevant to a trust assessment. An 
evidence element related to the availability of a service 
operation is, for example, the response time for a 
particular call of the service operation.  
Evidence elements can be of two different types, 
namely Operational Evidence Elements (OEE) and 
Recommendations. The elements of the former type (i.e., 
operational evidence elements) are collected during the 
operation of a service at runtime and, therefore, provide 
objective operational evidence about the service. 
Recommendations, on the other hand, are provided by 
service clients and, thus, constitute subjective evidence. 
Both recommendations and operational evidence 
elements are related to a particular context of service 
deployment and are valid only within this context, as 
expressed by the association EvidenceElement 
−validIn→Context in Figure 2. The response time 
recorded for a particular service invocation may have, for 
example, as context the service level agreement under 
which the service made the particular response, the client 
to which the response was made and its characteristics 
(e.g., its location, whether it’s a business or private client), 
the time when the response was made (peek vs. off-peak 
service hours), and the location of the service itself (if the 
service is mobile). 
An evidence digest element presents an aggregated 
account of a set individual evidence elements which 
underpin a trust assessment. The average prescription 
delivery time of a pharmacy service in the scenario of 
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 In the paper, we use the term ClassA−associationEndName→ClassB 
to refer to an association between ClassA and ClassB in the conceptual 
trust model that has an association end called associationEndName 
attached to ClassB. 
Section 2, for example, would be an evidence digest for 
the individual delivery times collected for the particular 
service. Similarly the total number of cases where a 
request for a service to a particular doctor has been 
declined would be an evidence digest for all the individual 
cases spotted with respect to this trust criterion. Evidence 
digests which are derived from recommendation elements 
following some reputation algorithm (e.g., simple 
summation, average, Bayesian [9]) constitute a Reputation 
in our trust model. 
Like evidence elements, evidence digests are also 
relative to a context that enables their interpretation (see 
association EvidenceDigest−relatesTo→Context in Figure 
2). The context of a digest element in a trustcard refers to 
characteristics of the deployment of the service including 
characteristics of the operational environment of the 
service (e.g. type of used infrastructure, network 
conditions, applicable security mechanisms and policies), 
the periods of service deployment, the types of service 
clients etc.  
Trustcards are given to service clients by the trust 
authority upon request. When they receive a trustcard, 
service clients may perform their own trust judgment by 
considering the information in the trustcard with regards 
to the specific context in which it was requested and other 
trust requirements (e.g., their acceptable level of risk, 
interests, and preferences). It should also be noted that 
trustcards are associated with an uncertainty measure. 
This measure reflects the uncertainty which may exist in a 
trust assessment if there are conflicting and/or limited 
evidence elements for the trust assessment criteria. 
Finally, trustcards get the status of trust certificates when 
the trust authority which has produced them assumes also 
legal responsibility for them. 
B. Trust assessment platform 
The realisation of trust assessments and provision of 
trustcards at runtime is supported by a platform whose 
general architecture is shown in Figure 3. This platform 
acts as a server that can provide trustcards to service 
clients requesting them for the services that they use, and 
trust assessment services to service providers wishing to 
subscribe to the platform in order to get their services 
assessed and thereby expand their client base. Trust 
assessment services may also be requested by third parties 
for specific services if these parties wish to act as brokers 
for the services. This role can be typically assumed by 
service registries that are willing to provide information 
for and access to services, only if the latter agree to 
become the subject of a continuous trust assessment 
during their deployment3. Service clients can enquire the 
platform for trustcards that cover specific trust assessment 
criteria and service providers can subscribe to the 
platform to initiate assessments of their services. 
As shown in Figure 3. the trust assessment platform 
incorporates six components, namely a 
TrustAssessmentManager, an EventBus, Monitors, 
EventCaptorGenerators, EventCaptors, and 
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 Currently, we assume that the trust assessment platform operates 
separately from a service registry. This, however, needs not to be the 
case and the trust assessment platform can be incorporated within a 
broader service registry infrastructure. 
TrustCriteriaGenerators (the components of the platform 
appear in grey boxes in Figure 3). 
The TrustAssessmentManager provides the interface 
for accessing the platform. This interface (i.e., the 
TrustAssessmentInterface in Figure 3) offers operations 
for: (i) requesting trustcards for particular properties of 
particular services, (ii) requesting the initialisation of trust 
assessments of services based on specific properties, and 
(iii) providing information for activating the emission of 
events from services to the platform. The trust assessment 
manager has also responsibility for maintaining evidence 
elements and evidence digests that underpin the dynamic 
creation of trustcards, and managing trust assessment 
subscriptions by notifying all subscribers of updates in the 
trustcards that they have subscribed for.  
The trust assessment manager is built on the top of 
monitors. Monitors collect the evidence elements required 
for trust assessment, and aggregate them into evidence 
digests. The evidence elements collected by monitors 
correspond to web-service events captured at runtime (e.g. 
service invocations and responses) and invocations of 
specific operations of the platform by service clients to 
provide subjective information about web-services.  
In the current prototype of the platform, the monitors 
are implemented as web-services based on the monitoring 
framework described in [12][13]. This framework uses 
monitoring rules and assumptions which determine what 
information should be collected from different services, 
what conditions this information should satisfy to be 
usable, and how it could be combined to generate 
evidence digests that can substantiate assessments with 
respect to specific trust criteria (see Section 4 for more 
details). Monitors provide a MonitoringInterface (see 
Figure 3) that is used by the TrustAssessmentManager to 
provide the rules that need to be monitored in order to 
obtain the evidence elements and digests required for trust 
assessments.  
 
Figure 3.  Architecture of the trust assessment platform 
The TrustCriteriaGenerator is the component of the 
platform that generates the monitoring rules and 
assumptions which are used for carrying runtime trust 
assessments. The generation of these rules and 
assumptions is driven by the guaranteed terms in the SLA 
of a service that needs to be assessed by the trust 
assessment platform. These terms are provided to the 
TrustCriteriaGenerator by the TrustAssessmentManager 
through the CriteriaGeneratorInterface of the former 
component. The design of the platform allows the 
incorporation of different types of trust criteria generators 
in order to support the generation of trust assessment 
specifications from different languages for specifying 
SLAs. An example of generating monitoring rules from 
service guarantee terms expressed in WS-Agreement (as 
described in [12]) is given in Section 4. 
The trust assessment platform also incorporates 
different types of event captors. Event captors operate 
remotely from the platform and have responsibility for 
intercepting messages which are exchanged between web 
services and their clients, generating events to represent 
these messages and sending the events to the platform for 
analysis. Event captors are service proxies which are 
generated automatically by the platform based on the 
WSDL specification of a service and the criteria set for its 
trust assessment.  
The generation of event captors is the responsibility of 
the EventCaptorGenerators in the platform. By virtue of 
their automatic generation, event captors are expected to 
execute correctly in all circumstances and be able to 
collect the required evidence elements from a service at 
runtime, following their installation in the operational 
environment of the service. 
The notification of events from event captors to the 
monitors takes place through the EventBus. This 
component operates as a publish/subscribe notifier that 
forwards events to the monitors according to subscriptions 
of the latter for specific types of events of particular 
services. These subscriptions are generated by the 
TrustAssessmentManager using the SubscriptionInterface 
of the EventBus. 
Although, a detailed account of the way in which our 
platform is secured is beyond the scope of this paper, we 
should note that basic security issue is addressed by the 
use of a public key infrastructure (PKI). This means that 
the links between the platform and the event captors use 
secure channels (typically SSL/TLS tunnels), which 
provide communication confidentiality. Also all the data 
which are exchanged within the platform are integrity-
protected, using typically a keyed-Hash Message 
Authentication Code (HMAC), and possibly bound to 
particular software configurations if Proof-Carrying Code 
(PCC) or Trusted Computing are used. In that case, 
cryptographic keys can be hardware-protected in the 
Trusted Platform Module and secure channels are 
reinforced via mutual attestation of software 
configurations on both sides of the communication (a 
detailed account of the use of Trusted Computing for this 
purpose is given in [10]). 
In connection with basic security, we should also note 
that the design of the trust assessment platform assumes 
that services and service clients are identified by their 
public keys with the use of Certification Authorities 
(CAs) that are accepted as valid by the trust authority that 
operates the platform, so that information can be 
encrypted to them and only read by the intended recipient. 
Reciprocally, the various actors ensure mutual 
authentication by encrypting trustcard requests or 
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IV. GENERATION OF TRUSTCARDS 
In the following, we discuss how to specify and 
operationalise trust assessments using the trust assessment 
platform. Initially, we first provide an overview of the 
specification of trust assessment criteria and then we give 
an example of deriving these criteria from an SLA and 
using them to generate trustcards. 
A. Specification of trust assessment criteria 
The criteria for the generation of trustcards are 
specified in an Event Calculus based language which is 
supported by the monitor of the trust assessment 
framework, called EC-Assertion. A detailed account of 
this language is beyond the scope of this paper and may 
be found in [12][13]. In the following, however, we give a 
brief overview of it to enable the reader understand the 
example of trust assessment that we present later. 
EC-Assertion is a first-order temporal logic language 
based on Event Calculus [18] which supports the 
specification of monitoring conditions in terms of events 
and fluents.  
An event in EC-Assertion is an occurrence that takes 
place at a specific instance of time (e.g., invocation of a 
system operation, receipt or dispatch of a message) and 
may have an effect. The occurrence of an event in EC-
Assertion is represented by the predicate 
Happens(e,t,ℜ(lb,ub)). This predicate denotes that an 
instantaneous event e occurs at some time t within the 
time range ℜ(lb,ub) (i.e., lb ≤ t ≤ ub). Events represent 
invocations of system operations, responses from such 
operations, or exchanges of messages between different 
system components and are expressed as terms of the 
following form: e(_id, _sender, _receiver, _status, _sig, 
_source). In this term: (i) _id is a unique identifier of the 
event, (ii) _sender is the identifier of the agent (system 
component or external actor) that sends the message 
represented by the event, (iii) _receiver is the identifier of 
the system component that receives the message 
represented by the event, (iii) _status represents whether 
the event is a request (REQ) or a response to a request 
(RES), (iv) _sig is the signature of the dispatched message 
or the operation invocation/response represented by the 
event, comprising the operation name and its 
arguments/result, and (v) _source is the identifier of the 
component where the event was captured.  
Fluents in EC-Assertion are conditions which may 
change over time (e.g. a fluent may indicate that a system 
has received a message) and are initiated and/or 
terminated by events. Fluents are represented by relations 
between objects of the form rel(O1, …, On) where rel is 
the name of a relation which associates the n objects O1, 
…, and On. The initiation or termination of a fluent f due 
to the occurrence of an event e at time t is denoted in EC-
Assertion by the predicates Initiates(e,f,t) and 
Terminates(e,f,t), respectively. An EC-Assertion formula 
may also use the predicates Initially(f) and HoldsAt(f,t) to 
denote that a fluent f holds at the start of the execution of 
a system and at time t, respectively. A formula in EC-
Assertion is specified in terms of the above predicates and 
has the general form body ⇒ head. Formulas can be of 
two different types: monitoring rules or assumptions. 
Monitoring rules are formulas which are checked against 
runtime events to establish if they are satisfied and their 
meaning is that if the body evaluates to True, the head 
must also evaluate to True. Assumptions, on the other 
hand, are formulas which are used to generate 
information. If the body of an assumption evaluates to 
True at runtime, its head is assumed to be True by 
deduction. 
EC-Assertion is used to express operational 
specifications of trust assessment criteria in the trust 
assessment platform. These specifications are generated 
from SLAs by the trust criteria generators of the platform. 
An example of this generation is given in the following 
section but prior to this it is important to provide some 
justification of the choice of EC-Assertion as the language 
for the specification of trust assessment criteria in our 
approach. 
This choice has been motivated by the fact that EC-
Assertion advocates a generic but simple modeling 
ontology based on events and fluents, and supports an 
explicit representation of the time of occurrence of these 
events and fluents and the specification of explicit 
constraints regarding this time. Due to these 
characteristics, EC-Assertion enables the specification of 
a wide spectrum of behavioural and QoS properties for 
software services. These properties may be atomic or 
aggregate, i.e., they may refer to specific interactions 
between a service and its environment (e.g. the response 
time of a service for specific operation invocation calls) or 
sets of such interactions (e.g. the average response time of 
all the invocations of a particular service operation). 
Finally, due to its foundation upon Event Calculus, EC-
Assertion has a formal and well understood semantics 
which is important for the specification of formal and 
precise trust assessment properties.  
B. Example 
Our example of trust assessment criteria is based on 
the e-healthcare system we introduced in Section 2 and 
focuses on the assessment of trust for pharmacy services. 
Enquiries for trustcards for such services may be raised by 
HTS in different circumstances, including for example 
cases where the pharmacy service which is currently used 
for a specific area is not responding and a runtime search 
for a replacement has identified services that HTS has not 
used before and, therefore, has no trust in. A trustcard 
may also be requested in cases where HTS wants to 
reassure itself about the trustworthiness of a pharmacy 
service that it has used before at runtime. HTS can request 
a trustcard when the need for it arises (pull mode) and/or 
subscribe to the trust platform for regular trustcard 
updates for a given service (push mode). Trustcards can 
be requested for specific service properties that have been 
specified in the SLA published by the service. 
In our example, suppose that the SLA of the pharmacy 
service includes a term indicating that for patient 
addresses which are within a given set of postcodes the 
delivery time is guaranteed to be at most 60 minutes after 
the acceptance of an order. Suppose also that the 
pharmacy service offers the following operations: 
(i) An operation confirm_order(patient_address, 
orderRefNum) which a client can call in the service to 
confirm an order following an earlier quotation for a 
requested prescription by the pharmacy service. This 
operation takes as input the reference number of the 
order that is confirmed (orderRefNum) and the 
delivery address of the patient. 
(ii) An operation delivered(orderRefNum) which is called 
by the agents who deliver prescriptions to patients to 
confirm that the prescription related to OrderRefNum 
has been delivered to the patient. 
Given the above operations, the SLA guarantee term 
about the maximum prescription delivery time can be 
specified as shown in Figure 4. This specification is based 
on the extended schema for WS-Agreement that has been 
introduced in [12]. In WS-Agreement, the specification of 
an SLA guarantee term consists of a qualifying condition 
specifying a precondition that should be satisfied for the 
enforcement of a service guarantee term, and a service 
level objective that specifies the conditions that must be 
met in order to satisfy the service guarantee term. In the 
extended schema for WS-Agreement introduced in [12], 
both qualifying conditions and service level objectives are 
specified in EC-Assertion. 
The EC-Assertion formula shown in Figure 4 4 
specifies a service level objective expressing the 
maximum prescription delivery time that is promised by 
the pharmacy service. The formula states that following a 
call to the pharmacy service _sID to confirm an order 
request by a service client _cID (see the event  e(_eID1, 
_sID, _cID, RES, confirm_order(_address, 
_orderRefNum), _sID) in the formula), the deliverer of the 
prescription (_dID) will also call the pharmacy service to 
confirm the delivery of the order within 3600000 
milliseconds (see the event e(_eID2, _dID, _sID, REQ, 
delivered(_orderRefNum), _sID) in the formula).  
A request for a trustcard can then refer to exactly this 
item in the SLA of the pharmacy service. Upon receiving 
the request, the trust assessment platform checks whether 
it can provide a trustcard matching the request and, if it 
can, it generates the trustcard for the particular property of 
the service and sends it to the requester. The availability 
of appropriate trustcards depends on: (a) whether the trust 
assessment authority has initialised a trust assessment 
activity for the SLA of the particular service before it 
receives the request for the trustcard, and (b) if by the 
time that it receives the request it has a sufficient number 
of evidence elements to generate a trustcard.  
The trust assessment platform can generate 
automatically the trust assessment criteria for the SLA 
guarantee term shown in Figure 4 in order to capture the 
primitive evidence elements and produce the evidence 
digests required for the trust assessment of the particular 
SLA term of the pharmacy service. For SLAs expressed in 
the extended form of WS-Agreement, as in Figure 4. , the 
generation of trust assessment criteria is based on the 
following transformation pattern: 
(GTA1): <C> ∧ <B> ∧ <H> ∧  
HoldsAt(Satisfied(<GT>,<S>,_SGT), t) ⇒ 
Initiates(<H>, Satisfied(<GT>,<S>,_SGT+1) 
max(tVar(<B>⇒<H>))+1)    
                                                           
4
 The figure shows the formula in a high level non XML syntax of EC-
Assertion. Underscored names in the formula denote non time 
variables and all the non explicitly qualified variables are assumed to 
be universally qualified. 
<guaranteeTerm name=”DeliveryTime”> 
<variables> <variable name=_address />… 
<variable name=_orderRefNum /> 
</variables> 
<qualifyingCondition id=C1> … </qualifyingCondition> 
<serviceLevelObjective> <guaranteeFormula> 
<formula id=R1> … </formula> 
</guaranteeFormula> </serviceLevelObjective> 
</guaranteeTerm> 
 
Figure 4.  An example of a pharmacy service SLA 
(GTA2) <C> ∧ <B> ∧ ¬<H> ∧ 
HoldsAt(Violated(<GT>,<S>,_VGT), t) ⇒ 
Initiates(<B>, Violated(<GT>,<S>,_VGT+1), 
max(tVar(<B> ⇒ <H>))+1) 
In this pattern, 
? <S> is a placeholder for the identifier of the relevant 
service and <GT>  is a placeholder for the identifier 
of the service guarantee term 
? <B> and <H> are placeholders for the body and the 
head of the EC-Assertion formula B ⇒ H that defines 
the service level objective of the term 
? <C> is placeholder for the context of the service 
guarantee term (i.e., the conjunction of the qualifying 
conditions under which the service guarantee term 
must be satisfied in WS-Agreement). 
? max(tVar(<B> ⇒ <H>)) is the time variable in the 
formula B ⇒ H that can take the maximum possible 
value (i.e., the time variable of the event that is 
expected to occur after all other events in the formula)  
The application of the above transformation pattern 
generates two assumption formulas GTA1 and GTA2 for 
each service guarantee term GT. The first formula (GTA1) 
maintains a satisfaction counter of the guarantee term and 
increases its value in cases  where when the context 
conditions of the term (i.e., <C>) are satisfied, the EC 
formula that defines the term (i.e., the EC-Assertion 
formula <B> ⇒ <H>) is also satisfied The second 
formula (GTA2) maintains a counter of cases where even 
though the context conditions of the service guarantee 
term are satisfied, the EC-Assertion formula that defines 
the term is violated (i.e., <C> ∧ <B> ∧ ¬<H> is True). 
The two counters used in such cases are represented by 
the fluents Satisfied(<GT>,<S>,_SGT) and 
Violated(<GT>,<S>,_VGT), respectively. 
Based on the above pattern the following two 
assumptions will be generated for the formula R1 in 
Figure 4. : 
R1A1: ∀ t1,t2:Time 
Happens(e(_eID1, _sID, _cID, REQ, 
confirm_order(_address,_orderRefNum), _sID), 
t1,R(t1,t1)) ∧ 
HoldsAt(fastPostcode(_address.postcode),t1) ∧ 
Happens(e(_eID2, _dID, _sID, REQ, 
delivered(_orderRefNum), _sID), t2,R(t1, 
t1+3600000)) ∧  
∀ t1,t2:Time 
Happens(e(_eID1, _sID, _cID, REQ, confirm_order(_address, 
_orderRefNum), _sID), t1,R(t1,t1)) ∧ 
HoldsAt(fastPostcode(_address.postcode),t1) ⇒ 
Happens(e(_eID2, _dID, _sID, REQ, delivered(_orderRefNum), 
_sID), t2,R(t1, t1+3600000))
∀ t:Time 
HoldsAt(fastPostcode(_address
.postcode),t)  
HoldsAt(Satisfied(R1,_sID,_SR1), _t2) ⇒ 
Initiates(e(_eID2, _dID, _sID, REQ, 
delivered(_orderRefNum), _sID), 
Satisfied(R1,_sID,oc:self:add(_SR1,1)),t2+1) 
R1A2: ∀ t1,t2:Time 
Happens(e(_eID1, _sID, _cID, REQ, 
confirm_order(_address, _orderRefNum), _sID), 
t1, R(t1,t1)) ∧ 
HoldsAt(fastPostcode(_address.postcode),t1)  ∧ 
¬ Happens(e(_eID2, _dID, _sID, REQ, 
delivered(_orderRefNum), _sID), t2, 
R(t1, t1+3600000)) ∧ 
HoldsAt(Violated(_sID,_VR1) _t2) ⇒ 
Initiates(e(_eID1, _sID, _cID, REQ, 
confirm_order(_address,_orderRefNum),_sID), 
Violated(R1, _sID, oc:self:add(_VR1,1)),t2+1) 
The above formulas are generated by instantiating the 
transformation pattern using the following substitution of 
terms in the service guarantee formula R1 for the 
placeholders of the pattern: 
? <C>: HoldsAt(fastPostcode(_address.postcode), 
t) 
?  <B>: Happens(e(_eID1, _sID, _cID, REQ, 
confirm_order(_address, _orderRefNum), 
_sID), t1,R(t1,t1)) ∧ 
HoldsAt(fastPostcode(_address.postcode),
t1) 
? <H>: Happens(e(_eID2, _dID, _sID, REQ, 
delivered(_orderRefNum), _sID), t2,R(t1, 
t1+3600000)) 
? <GT>: R1 
? <S>: _sID 
Following the generation of the above assumptions, 
the trust assessment platform assigns them to the monitor. 
When it receives them the monitor starts checking the 
confirm_order and delivered events and uses the formulas 
R1A2 and R1A2 to deduce the values of the satisfaction and 
violation counters for R1. The formulas R1A2 and R1A2 
also determine the evidence elements and digests that 
need to be maintained for the trust assessment of the 
particular SLA term. In particular, at any given time point 
t,  
? the evidence elements include the instances of R1A2 
and R1A2 that have been generated by the monitor 
following unification with runtime events up to time t 
in order to update the values of the guarantee term 
satisfaction and violation counters, and 
? the evidence digests are the values of the counters 
_SR1 and _VR1 at  t.  
This information is maintained by the platform and 
used to generate a trustcard when requested. The 
generated trustcards are associated with an uncertainty 
measure about the trustworthiness of a service with 
respect to the particular service guarantee term expressed 
by the card. This measure is calculated as the number of 
the violations of the service guarantee term over the total 
number of the cases of its assessment (i.e., the ratio 
_VR1/(_VR1 + _SR1) in our example).  
It should be noted that the generation of a trustcard 
may depend on additional criteria that the trust authority 
may have for the particular case. In our example, these 
criteria may include the minimum number of evidence 
elements (i.e., instances of R1A2 and R1A2) that the 
authority must have before generating a trustcard. More 
complex criteria may also be used by the trust authority. 
Such a criterion could be to have evidence elements from 
interactions of the service with at least K different clients 
before issuing a trustcard.  
V. RELATED WORK 
Trust is a complex concept studied from multiple 
perspectives [22] including the prominent perspectives of 
system security and the socio-economic modelling of 
trust. In the following we provide an overview of work in 
these two areas, noting that the gap between them is still 
significant. 
In the security domain, different strands of research 
have addressed issues of authentication, authorisation, 
confidentiality and availability of SOCs and have 
generated standards such as WS-Trust and WS-Policy for 
representing security credentials and policies regarding 
these credentials [4]. Trust reasoning and management 
platforms are also being developed in this context for Grid 
applications [1][23]. Trust management proposed more 
complex credential policies and standard algorithms for 
checking policy compliance, such as in KeyNote [3] and 
SULTAN [8], but these solutions suffer from the lack of 
efficiency and expressiveness in practice. Trusted 
Computing [11] is a recent security paradigm that 
proposes to semi-formally implement a chain of trust 
providing the ability to represent reliably and 
communicate securely software configuration states along 
execution chains (e.g., BIOS, boot loader, virtualisation 
kernel, OS kernel). This is based on hashes of application 
binaries and configuration files, called measurements, 
which are signed using hardware-protected cryptographic 
keys. These measurements do not provide any information 
about properties of the application and may lack 
information about its operational environment. A 
fundamental issue in the security domain is the fact that 
trust is only considered as the trust that a security user, or 
security service consumer, has in a remote security 
provider following a chain of cryptographic tools. 
On the other hand, work in the socio-economic area of 
trust has proposed a plethora of models and systems 
which tackle the concept of trust from a wider 
perspective. Trust factors, such as credibility, ease of use 
or risk, have been elicited in e-commerce [5] offering 
design and (web) interface elements and models of trust 
that can be used as starting points for HCI developers. 
Design methodologies of pervasive systems have been 
augmented with trust requirements [10] such as audit trail 
(or accountability), harm, reliability and accuracy. Other 
work has focused on topics such as website credibility [7] 
and reputation [9], [17]. McKnight and Chervany [14] 
give a wide account of research on trust in the domains of 
management, sociology, economics, politics, science and 
psychology. 
Most modern approaches to trust consider static 
information and fixed scenarios. The runtime assessment 
of trust includes the dynamic verification of whether trust 
rules are consistent with the behaviour of a system 
(multiagent systems [16], open and distributed systems 
[15]) and the monitoring of trust specifications (e.g. 
adaptive systems trust monitoring [19]). There is also 
some work on monitoring the dynamic operation of 
partners in virtual organizations (VOs) in order to identify 
their failure to meet obligations established during the 
formation of VOs [6]. 
The approach that we take in this paper differs from 
the above work in two respects: it takes a comprehensive 
view over trust assessment and uses runtime data to 
generate and update trustcards expressing trust in specific 
terms of SLAs between service providers and consumers. 
Security credentials and policies can be modelled in our 
framework [21] but the service client is not limited to 
these and can use other properties such as reliability and 
efficiency. Subjective information can also be integrated 
into the approach via the use of service client 
recommendations. Furthermore, our approach addresses 
dynamic service use scenarios and captures the composite 
nature of trust in the concept of trustcards. Finally, the 
process of property assessment is automatic and can 
derive trustcards on the fly, while service clients are 
updated when changes occur. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we have discussed the issue of assessing 
trust in SOC systems based on runtime information and 
highlighted the limitations of existing approaches in this 
respect. To address these limitations, we have proposed a 
model for dynamic assessment of web service trust and a 
platform that realises the model. The assessment of trust 
in this model is based on trustcards. Trustcards provide 
assessments of the trustworthiness of web services with 
respect to different criteria. These assessments are based 
on information collected by monitoring web services in 
different operational contexts and subjective assessments 
of trust provided by different service clients and situated 
in specific operational contexts. Trustcards enable service 
clients to make better informed and dynamic decisions 
about the services they deploy and adapt dynamically to 
changes that may affect the trustworthiness of services. 
The platform that we have proposed to realise the 
model is based on a service monitoring framework 
developed at City University [12][13] and extends it with 
capabilities that enable the dynamic generation, provision 
and maintenance of trustcards. More specifically, the 
underlying monitoring framework provides the 
implementation of the monitors in the platform and has 
been extended by components as discussed in Section III. 
The proposed platform has been partially implemented 
and some of its components, notably the ones supporting 
the automatic generation of event captors, are still under 
development. Current work looks also at extensions of the 
platform to make it usable by coalitions of users wanting 
to form trust assessment collectively rather than 
centralised trust authorities as we have assumed here. We 
are also investigating ways of assessing the fit of existing 
trustcards to trust assessment requests coming from 
contexts that are not identical to the context of the 
generation of the trustcards. 
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